THE New Republic

Renewal of the Berlin Ultimatum

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JUNE 22, 1959

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Washington Wire

What's A Billion?

THIS WEEK-END the national debt stood at $285,874,257,213.25. This final figure is not easy to carry around in your head. Besides, the Treasury balance fluctuates a modest $50 million or so from day to day. We suggest the key statistic is .004 of an inch. That, the Bureau of Printing and Engraving assures us, is the thickness of a thousand dollar bill—One Grand.

A little multiplication of .004 will show you that a million dollars is simply a four-inch wad of thousand dollar bills. That's the equivalent of a fat paving brick.

What's a *billion?* A US "billion" is 1,000 million—9 ciphers (as contrasted to the British and German article, which is 1,000,000 million—12 ciphers). Add 9 ciphers to our American brick and you have, humph, let's see—4000 inches. All right?—how tall is 4000 inches in *feet?* The answer is 333 feet (with a lot of decimal .3's running off into infinity).

You see how everything is becoming simple. The national debt is now merely 285 columns of $1000 bills each rising to 333 feet, and stuck up all around Washington like TV masts. The Eisenhower economy deficit this year (largest in peacetime history) will add 13 more columns.

One thing in this little exercise dissatisfies us. Any millionaire who has tried piling up wads of thousand dollar bills will tell you that they won't lie flat. There would be airspace, see, between bills. Let us be practical and realistic. Say simply that "a billion dollars" is a pile of $1000 bills that rises as high as the Washington Monument (550 feet). There, that does it.

Republicans are chortling over the way they feel they have Democratic leader Lyndon Johnson mouse-trapped. If he offers bills they declare he is "budget-busting," and if he delays bills they charge he is running a "won't do" Congress. These attacks are made on alternate days. President Eisenhower was not above taunting Johnson at the $100-a-plate GOP rally here by declaring of the Democrats that "never have so many done so little" for the country. GOP National Committee chairmen repeat the charge frequently. Johnson got into the trap after the big Democratic victory in November. Without consulting the Democratic Advisory Council he accepted Eisenhower's conservative terms of debate—that inflation is the key peril and that spending, in and of itself, is dangerous. Now he finds the delighted Republicans attacking him from the other side. Vastly sensitive, Johnson has responded with charges of "sabotage" against Republican leaders. In fairness to Johnson he has consistently and rather heroically tried to make the split government work and to follow what he regards as the path of "fiscal responsibility." The result of it all is that the big Democratic majority is off balance and on the defensive.

Who Else But Nels?

NELSON ROCKEFELLER'S visit here last week supplied a grace note or two to his developing Presidential campaign. But he is still keeping it under wraps and contenting himself with getting on a first-name basis with curious Congressmen. His real take-off point will be the sweeping legislative program he submits to the New York legislature in 1960.

The most amusing political development is Eisenhower's decision to send his brother, Milton, with Nixon to Moscow. This turns it into a two-man show and cuts the spotlight on Nixon. Nixon has already been warned to moderate the glad-hand approach in Russia which tends to turn his foreign travels into a kind of election campaign. The President was not trying to undercut Nixon, it is believed, in sending along Milton (president of Johns-Hopkins and one of the President's closest advisers). He simply wanted to get a better look at the Soviet Union through his brother's eyes. It is interpreted here as one of those unconscious White House slights to Nixon which the latter has dutifully borne since taking office.

"I Swear . . ."

MCCARTHYISM continues, Sarah Lawrence College history professor Bert James Loewenberg, internationally known Darwin authority, was denied a Fulbright Foreign Scholarship without a hearing and "solely on the grounds," the Mississippi Valley Historical Association charges, "that his loyalty to the US is suspect." Unevaluated government loyalty files are used in the selections. Four academic associations have protested.

Meanwhile, college recipients of the new Federal science loan scholarships find they must take ignominious oaths of loyalty. About a dozen colleges, including Princeton, Amherst and Bryn Mawr, say they won't handle the loans under these terms.

Finally, a Court of Appeals panel rules that newspaperman William Worthy Jr. can't get a passport to go to China if the State Department says "No," and simultaneously the State Department is telling Congressmen that it objects to giving them passports for the same country. The assumption seems to be that the less the country knows about its enemy the better.

Notes

AFTER TELLING GRADUATES of the Foreign Service Institute last week that before leaving office he would send to Congress a plan to enable top government officials "more time to think," Mr. Eisenhower put in four thoughtful rounds of golf in Washington and Gettysburg through the long week-end.

Sixty-three city Democrats, representing Northern consumer districts, voted against the latest bill to prop the price of wheat. The bill squeaked through the House, 188 to 177, but the consumer revolt is considered significant. There is now a two-year supply of wheat in storage, costing $3 billion. And $3 billion, you remember, is three columns of $1,000 bills rising as high as the Washington Monument.

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *Pound and US Treason Law*

SIRS:

WILLIAM ROGERS' essay on the Ezra Pound case (*NR*, June 1) contains several penetrating comments, but presents a garbled version of American treason law. "The only crime set out in the Constitution," Rogers writes, "it [trea-

(Continued on page 22)

The Ultimatum

SPECULATION about the motives behind Mr. Gromyko's renewal of the Soviet ultimatum—giving the West 12 months in which to accept Soviet terms for a Berlin settlement—has looked too exclusively in the direction of diplomatic tactics. Ingenious arguments have been thought up to answer the question of whether the new "toughness" of the Russians is intended to bring the Western powers more quickly to a summit conference or whether it indicates on the contrary that Mr. Khrushchev's interest in such a conference is less urgent than had been supposed. Yet the content of the Gromyko proposals, and the speed and manner in which they were "leaked," clearly suggest that the immediate purpose of this revival of Soviet threats is not to influence the negotiations in Geneva but to exert direct pressure on West Berlin and the German Federal Republic—to weaken morale there so as to deprive the West of one of the principal assets on which its negotiating position is built.

When Mr. Khrushchev first raised the twin issues of the Western presence in Berlin and of a peace treaty with Eastern Germany last winter, one of his principal motives was anxiety for the future of his East German satellite; he wanted to obtain Western recognition of the Ulbricht regime so as to discourage the persistent opposition of its subjects. Today he knows that this recognition is not obtainable at the present time, but his anxiety is greatly diminished all the same; for discussions before and at the Geneva conference have shown that the Western powers, while refusing recognition out of regard for Western and particularly West German public opinion, have no serious intention of undermining the Ulbricht regime. By the perfunctory manner in which they presented their "package plan" for German unity and peace, and by their eagerness to negotiate a "stabilization" of their West Berlin position for an indefinite period "pending reunification," the Western foreign ministers have made it plain that they are ready to do anything to maintain the status quo in Europe, short of openly professing that policy.

The calculation of Mr. Herter, Selwyn Lloyd and Couve de Murville seems to have been that if we showed consideration for Ulbricht's prestige needs by a willingness to deal with him as an "agent" of the Soviets, by encouraging contacts between the two Germanies and by toning down "cold war propaganda," Mr. Khrushchev in turn would show consideration for Western prestige by recognizing indefinitely our rights in Berlin. Even the eventual conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Russia and East Germany might then pass off without a crisis if only Russia instructed Ulbricht to respect the West's position and to drop the claim that the whole of Berlin was part of his territory. The underlying assumption would seem to have been that because Mr. Khrushchev shares our interest in avoiding World War, he also shares the visions of political stability dear to Western diplomats.

But like his predecessor, Mr. Khrushchev sees contemporary history as

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a relentless struggle between two "camps"—his and ours. In this struggle he has lately been on the offensive in large parts of the world, but still on the defensive in Europe. By relieving him of his worry that we might continue bringing political pressure against his most vulnerable satellite, our governments have proved to him that he can afford to pass to the offensive in Europe too. This he has done by renewing his campaign against Western bases in the Mediterranean, and by suggesting that we should begin the evacuation of West Berlin.

In West Berlin this campaign still makes very little impact. Still, the hundreds of active opponents of Communism whose addresses are daily listed in the East Berlin press as "centers of subversion and espionage" (even under safe Western occupation, they are systematically harassed in ways ranging from nightly telephone calls to the throwing of little teargas bombs into their letterboxes) can hardly feel comfortable when they read about the Geneva proposals for reducing garrisons in West Berlin or "neutralizing" the city. But in the Federal Republic, frustrated opposition to Dr. Adenauer's authoritarian methods and frustrated desire for national unity have blinded a growing minority to the dangers threatening from the East and made them ripe to consider the most absurd proposals for reaching unity by negotiation with Ulbricht. When the deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party chooses the present, of all times, to proclaim that a Socialist could not conduct the struggle against Communism in alliance with the Christian Democrats, one can hardly blame Khrushchev for taking this as evidence that Western Germany is ceasing to be a stable bulwark of the West.

In the light of these facts, it is possible to make a guess as to how seriously the various Russian threats are meant. The proposal for agreement between Western and Eastern Germany on peace and reunification within a year is mere propaganda, intended to divide West German opinion. The threat of a separate peace treaty between Russia and East Germany within a year is seriously meant, and there is nothing we can do to prevent it; but it will not do any real harm by itself, unless combined with a Soviet denial of Western rights in Berlin. The Soviet intention to whittle down these rights is also serious, but whether it will be carried to crisis point will depend on the firmness and determination shown by us in resisting a whittling down and in preparing both technically and politically for the crisis: the more we try to avoid it by concessions, the more certainly it will come; the more we prepare to withstand it, the less likely it will be.

The final question remains whether the West should by now have broken off the unproductive Geneva talks, or whether it should still aim at a summit meeting. Certainly a situation in which Mr. Eisenhower solemnly asserts his refusal to negotiate under threats, and his Secretary of State goes on talking in the full knowledge that the threat continues to exist, is not only undignified but a positive invitation to further Russian blackmail. The time has come to refuse talking any further *about Berlin* until the Russians give assurances that our position in that city and our access to it will be respected.

At the same time, we ought to remain willing to meet the Russians, even at the summit, on *other issues,* notably the relatively promising negotiations for a controlled ban on atomic tests. This is not only necessary to prove our interest in maintaining peace to neutral opinion; it may lay the foundation for a real contribution to reducing the risks of war by permanently limiting the circle of atomic powers. And the prospect of agreement on such issues, genuinely in the common interest of both sides, is the one factor which, *if combined with firmness on Berlin itself,* may still induce the Russians to back away from the "crisis" they have themselves created.

Guatemala—Back to '54?

Guatemala's three million people—two-thirds are illiterate, poverty-stricken Indians—have had little to be thankful for in their rulers. One corrupt and indifferent regime has followed another, nearly all right-wing dictatorships. The one experiment with social change began under President Arévalo (1945-50) and collapsed with the fall of Arbenz in 1954, for which the US Government was in part responsible. Arbenz, although not a Communist himself, was running what to Washington was or was about to become a Red regime, dangerous to US interests—and to those of United Fruit, the leading investor in Guatemala. And so Ambassador Peurifoy was sent as trouble shooter to the land of the Quetzal. He found the Castillo Armas revolution brewing and gave it his blessing, which the State Department then backed up with $80 million for road construction and the buttressing of Guatemala's falling coffee prices. Guatemala had been saved from the "Reds."

Still, things have not gone well. Castillo Armas proved a weak and ineffective successor to Arbenz; then he got himself shot by an assassin. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who took over and is in power today, is a conservative general and former henchman of the dictator Ubico, deposed in 1944. A minority president, Fuentes has failed to win popular support.

Now there are rumblings of new troubles, reports that the "Reds" are slipping back into the country—among them Paz Tejada, former Minister of Defense, and Guillermo Toriello, Arbenz's dynamic Minister of Foreign Affairs. Former president Arévalo is expected to return from his exile in Venezuela to seek a Congressional seat. And the Guatemalans are not protesting: some have even joined the enemy. To cite one case, Clemente Morroquin Rojas, the ambitious and astute Minister of Agriculture

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in the Ydigoras government, is courting the leftists with diatribes against US aid. The leftist resurgence, according to the *Wall Street Journal* (May 22, 1959), "has a real chance of succeeding, quite possibly within a few months."

If there is a moral to this story, it is that putting down social upheavals with political revolutions of right-wing vintage will keep nothing settled for long in Latin America.

Upping the Debt Limit

THE PRESIDENT'S request for an increase in the debt limit and for authority to raise the interest rate on government bonds is by no means unforeseen. As Sen. Lyndon Johnson said, "Either the facts justify such an increase or they do not," and the facts are that the "temporary" rise in the limit voted last year is scheduled to expire on June 30, dropping the ceiling from $288 billion to $283 billion; and the actual national debt is estimated to stand at $285 billion on that date. Next winter, moreover, at the peak of the dry period when the Treasury has little income and normal outgo, the debt is likely temporarily to total around $292 billion; so the Administration's request for a "temporary" level of $295 billion allows no more than a justifiable leeway.

But if the academic issue of the debt ceiling runs into little real resistance in Congress, the issue of raising the rate from 3¼ to 3¾ percent on E and H savings bonds, and of eliminating any limitation with regard to the interest rate that the Treasury might offer on its marketable securities will meet a far different reception.

In opposing this proposal, the Democratic majority will have a wide and appreciative audience, since the interest rate on government bonds directly affects other interest rates. One family out of two is committed to payments on installment debt; any increase in the price of money will work quickly into the structure of consumer purchases. Holders of corporate bonds bearing 4-4½ percent will resist the erosion of prices of such securities. And state and local governments, many of which have legal restrictions on the prices they can pay for money, will regard with gloom any sweetening of their federal competition.

The interest on the national debt was estimated in the President's budget message in January as taking a dime out of every dollar of government expenditure, for a total of almost $8 billion in the fiscal year starting next month; with the increased rates now requested, this total would be raised by a further $500 million; and paying this amount would require just about the entire increase in the yield of the corporate income tax that is expected as a result of economic recovery.

In reviewing these economic facts, the Democrats will doubtless note that the total interest-bearing public debt was $263,946 million at the beginning of the first fiscal year after the Republicans took over, and $285,991 million at the end of May; that the average length of maturity of the marketable interest-bearing public debt has shortened from five years and four months at the end of fiscal 1953 to four years and nine months; that though the Administration had made a special point of its intention to avoid frequent financing by lengthening terms, the amount of debt maturing in 10 to 20 years has gone down, while the amount with a less-than-one-year maturity has risen under Eisenhower.

But when all of this has been said, the Democrats will be hard put to turn the Administration's proposals down. At present rates, E and H bonds simply are not attractive to investors; redemptions are running $309 million above sales so far this year, and even last year, sales kept ahead of redemptions only with great difficulty. Among marketable securities, aside from the $35 billion in Treasury bills which are rolled over in three- and six-month intervals, the coming fiscal year will see the need for renewal of $33.8 billion in Treasury certificates, and $7.09 billion in notes.

If the Democrats were really bent on making a distinction between the two parties, the fiscal issue might be presented in sharp form. The plain fact that over the coming period more of the things which the citizen and voter wants are going to be purchased through government account could be presented with no more revolutionary documentation than the CED's recently issued "Trends in Public Expenditure in the Next Decade." The fact that the way to make such purchases is to pay for them could be stressed—more than either the Democratic leaders in Congress or the Advisory Council of the party have done—and correlated with stress on the effect of such purchases on the growth of the gross national product.

But the frame of reference of the discussion is likely to be the frame that the President has rather successfully imposed on most of this year's economic decisions; and without an increase in federal revenue, a continued bumping along under successive debt ceilings is likely to find the opposition reduced to complaining but complying.

Barenblatt Case

DISSENTING from the Supreme Court opinion of June 8 which upheld the contempt conviction of former Vassar College instructor Lloyd Barenblatt for refusing to tell the House Un-American Activities Committee whether or not he was a Communist, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan adopted the proposition that Congress lacks the power under the Constitution to investigate individual Communist affiliations, when its dominant motive in conducting such an investigation is—as all the world knows—"exposure

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purely for the sake of exposure." In view of the disreputable behavior of the Congressional committee in question, this opinion of the dissenters evokes understandable sympathy. And yet, inquiry into the motives of Congressional action is extremely treacherous business for the judiciary to engage in. Moreover, the broad power of the legislature to investigate with a view to passing laws or with a view to not passing laws, and in investigating to expose, is one of the foundations of our form of government, not at all the recent pestiferous invention of the late Joseph McCarthy.

But in the Barenblatt case, as in the Watkins case of 1957, the Court could have reached the opposite result *without* attempting to restrict the scope of Congressional investigating power. It is too bad the Court did not see fit to do so, and elected rather to emasculate to a substantial extent the beneficial doctrine it announced in *Watkins*. In that case the Court said among other things that, broad and necessary as the powers of inquiry of each House of Congress may be, it must be each House as a whole that decides when to investigate what. It could not be said that the House of Representatives had made a responsible decision to investigate Communism among teachers or labor leaders when a generation ago it empowered the Un-American Activities Committee to look into so open-ended, almost wholly undefined a thing as "Un-American propaganda." If Congress is to delegate great power to one of its own committees, it should, as much as when it delegates to an administrative agency, speak in more precise, or at least in more comprehensible, terms than that. It isn't that Congress does not have the power; it is that *Congress* has not exercised it.

This was the avenue that was open to the Supreme Court in *Barenblatt* and that the Court failed to take. For the charter of the Un-American Activities Committee was the same inarticulate thing there as in the *Watkins* case. Acquiescence by the House in the activities of its committee should be of little if any relevance, just as Congressional acquiescence in the Secretary of State's passport denials of recent times was held to be irrelevant in *Kent* v. *Dulles* last year, in which the Court also required specific legislative authorization to be made. Legislatures do not express their will on important matters by fits of absent-mindedness, but by affirmative enactments.

Tax Evasions (Legal)

FOUR Democratic Senators have offered a series of bills which taken together are a serious attempt to push needed tax reforms.

Sen. Joseph Clark (D, Pa.) proposes to eliminate numerous luxury items now taken as ordinary business expense deductions—such as entertainment at night clubs, theatres and sporting events, as well as the maintenance of yachts, hunting lodges, gifts between businessmen, country club dues and travel to conventions outside the United States. Savings: $800 million.

Sen. William Proxmire (D, Wis.) would withhold income tax at the source for dividend and interest payment as is now done for wages and salaries. Savings: $750 million.

Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D, Minn.) would repeal the 1954 provision for a $50 credit and a 4 percent exclusion of dividends received from the actual tax of the taxpayer. Savings: $400 million.

Sen. Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) proposes to reduce the oil depletion allowance on a sliding-scale basis by reducing the existing 27½ percent deduction to 15 percent for those who receive income from oil and gas properties in excess of $5 million per year; from 27½ percent to 21 percent for those with income from oil and gas properties between $1 and $5 million, but with no reduction in the depletion allowance for the small royalty holders and wildcatters if their gross income from oil and gas does not exceed $1 million per year. Savings: $320 million.

Total savings: $2.27 billion.

These proposals have both long-run and short-run merits. The long-run purpose is to establish the principle that those with equal incomes—at whatever level—should pay equal taxes. This is not the case today. Oil companies are paying taxes on the average of one-third the amount paid by other corporations. Superior Oil Company, which presented Senator Case of South Dakota with $2,500 on the eve of the vote on the gas bill in 1956, had profits before taxes of $65.5 million in the period 1953-58. They not only paid no taxes whatsoever on this amount, but actually received a net rebate of $325,000 from the federal Treasury.

Some $1.5 billion yearly in dividends received and $3.5 billion in interest payments are not reported on tax returns and thus evade taxation. In the case of the dividend credit and exclusion, a man with $10,000 per year entirely from dividends pays 20 percent less in taxes than a man in a similar situation whose income is from wages and salary.

There will be two major opportunities before the end of this Congressional session when these bills can be pressed to a vote in the Senate. The first is on the bill to extend corporate and excise rates for another year. The second is on long-term interest rates.

The Treasury asserts that its failure to sell long-term bonds stems from the superior attractiveness of private investments because of the fear of inflation. If this is true, closing tax loopholes is an answer to their difficulties which lies much closer at hand than raising long-term interest rates above the 4½ percent ceiling. Plugging the loopholes could insure a budget surplus in fiscal 1960 and make government bonds more attractive by preventing the drain of private funds to those investments now made for tax evasion purposes.

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Dr. Adenauer's Pyrrhic Victory

Bonn

DR. ADENAUER took his decision to remain the West German Chancellor in a moment of pique and passion, on June 4, and confirmed it officially the next day. Since then he has explained—to the Bundestag on June 11—that this decision was only taken after "mature reflection." The phrase has a familiar ring, but there is no hint of consistency about it. In the Bundestag the Social Democratic opposition called on him to justify it, and Adenauer could find only two concrete reasons. One was the death of Mr. Dulles, the other the failure of the Geneva Conference of the Foreign Ministers. But Mr. Dulles was already dangerously ill on April 7, when Adenauer announced he would move upstairs to the Presidency of the Federal Republic. And neither the Chancellor nor anyone else expected concrete results to be achieved at Geneva.

Apart from the plain fact that the "Grand Old Man" is back in power until 1961, what has emerged from the "Chancellorship crisis"? First, it can be said that Adenauer is utterly unrepentant over a *volte face*, which placed his party and particularly his party's preferred candidate for Chancellor—Minister of Economics, Professor Erhard—in a very embarrassing position. He treated the Bundestag much as a veteran schoolmistress would treat the kindergarten class. On June 11 he was evasive, provocative and flippant by turns. And he embarrassed the luckless Professor Erhard once again by maintaining that he had told him about his prospective change of plan as far back as May 14. How could this be true? On May 24 Dr. Adenauer was still trying to force Dr. Etzel on the unwilling majority of his party as the next Chancellor. Even on the morning on June 4 Adenauer was worrying about the Presidential election taking place in Berlin. To him, a "little Rhinelander" by tradition and upbringing, Berlin is inimical, middle-European, politically left-wing, un-Catholic. His concern over the venue of the election was dictated by personal motives, and he tried to shift the responsibility for an unpopular decision onto the Western Powers.

But Professor Erhard too has cut an unconvincing figure. He returned from his visit to Washington on June 9, breathing fire and brimstone and vowing to have his showdown with Adenauer. What happened in the "showdown"? Quite simply, Professor Erhard gave in after a two-hour talk with Adenauer. He gave in, not because he had been given private satisfaction or promised a public apology but because he is not politically adept, and is personally good-natured and verging on "soft." Nor had he ever seriously intended to lead a revolt against Adenauer. His bluff was called.

In the third place, the Christian Democratic Party did not—in the last resort—merely acquiesce in Adenauer's reversal; it grovelled. Indeed, the Party was compromised before the debate of June 11 began. It had shrunk from tackling the real issue, which was whether Adenauer was still the right man to continue as Chancellor. The bold, fighting words used by members of the Party in the corridors faded into thinnest air. The Christian Democrat preferred to start up that mangy old hare—the domination of the Social Democratic Party by crypto-Communists, and especially by its Vice-Chairman, Herbert Wehner, a Communist Party member from 1931 to 1943. On June 11 the public galleries were crowded with West German citizens, a surprising proportion of them in the uniform of the Bundeswehr. They listened to a lame Social Democratic attack, and they did not hear a single word of honest regret and honorable intention from the Government side.

Finally, the Social Democrats have not benefited from the chaotic performance of the Christian Democrats as they should have done. This was partly due to differences within their own party, in which the right wing has been taking the leading hand with demands for a firmer policy in face of Soviet threats. It was partly due to ignorance of what was going on inside the Christian Democratic Party, and to an understandable doubt as to how to take advantage of it. If the Social Democrats attacked too tempestuously, the Government ranks would form up all the quicker in defense; but if they did not attack with sufficient strength, they would lay themselves open to the charge of not defending democratic principles boldly enough.

THE CHANCELLOR, according to the Social Democratic leader, Herr Ollenhauer, had acted "with supreme contempt for his fellow human-being." The phrase is not ill-chosen. Adenauer has trodden on Professor Erhard's feelings, not like the proverbial bull in a china shop, but with calculated elegance, and he has made no greater gesture of reconciliation than was required to maintain party unity. The reason, plainly, is that Adenauer will not want Erhard as Chancellor in 1961, for the same reasons that he does not want him now. The Christian Democratic Party has been subjected to the degrading process of being asked its views and then having them flung to the winds. All this will not be forgotten. Tactically Dr. Adenauer is as much in control of the situation as he has ever been; but he has sown dragon's teeth in his own party and he has blotted a record of magnificent and consistent behavior. Germans still want the force of fine example to inspire and enhearten them in this difficult era. The Chancellor has let them down.

TERENCE PRITTIE

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The "Morseberger" Breaks in Two

TRYING to predict what Wayne Morse will do is like trying to predict how many hurricanes will hit and in what force along the Atlantic Coast in 1960. Even so, his announcement that he will oppose the re-election of his Democratic colleague, Sen. Richard Neuberger, comes as a surprise. "In the campaign ahead," Morse says, "I intend to point out to the voters of Oregon the sorry record he [Neuberger] has made on issue after issue, and we will let the record speak for itself." The record does. Oregon's Senators have stood together on 85 percent of the votes. Where they have divided, it most often has been on foreign policy issues. Foreign Relations Committee member Morse's aggressive independence led him to bitter-end opposition to the Formosa Resolution in 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 in which Neuberger did not join. Morse also voted in 1957 against borrowing authority for the Development Loan Fund then being established and, as a gesture against military aid, against the entire foreign aid bill (a vote in effect against economic aid, too, in which Neuberger did not join). And he fought the 1958 move to make the Reciprocal Trade Act permanent; Neuberger supported it. On a variety of amendments to the reciprocal trade program, Neuberger has generally opposed restrictionist clauses, Morse favoring special protection for Oregon cherry growers and the like.

It did not begin this way. When the two Senators and the three Democratic Representatives they had helped elect got to Washington, the Oregon team had unity written all over it. The delegation ate breakfast together, issued joint press releases, introduced similar legislation. For quite a time, the others deferred to Morse, the old hand, and perhaps he came to expect that deference. Neuberger was so enraptured that he made a speech or two early in 1957 advancing Morse for President. And he followed up with an article in *The Progressive* (April 1, 1957) which makes interesting reading today—in it he suggested Jack Kennedy would make a good running-mate for Wayne.

But by the summer of '57, the bloom was off the rose. Morse voted against the mutual security bill, against the Middle East doctrine; Neuberger contrary. Morse abandoned the liberals, (including Neuberger) who were backing Sen. Paul Douglas' fight to put the civil rights bill directly on the Senate calendar instead of referring it to Senator Eastland's Judiciary Committee. "Parliamentary expediency," Morse called the maneuver, and sent copies of his comments all over Oregon. Senator Douglas offered to write a nice letter about Neuberger's great work for civil rights, and that was mailed out to Oregonians. "A snide attack on me," Morse called the letter, although he was not mentioned in it.

The two Senators took to swapping charges by mail. And by this time Neuberger was out to create a new image of himself in the public mind—not that of Morse's shadow or the less palatable part of a "Morseberger," as *Time* had called the team, but of a Senator who gets things done for Oregon. He succeeded, as his press clippings from Oregon today show. He has been largely responsible for Congressional adoption of the billboard ban in the highway bill, for legislation to make the Klamath forests (valued at about $100 million) perpetual yield forests, for the bill to create a National Park Service national monument at Fort Clatsop where Lewis and Clark concluded their expedition. Other Neuberger bills highly rated in Oregon dealing with power, fish and Indians are pending.

But the Junior Senator has had plenty of help from the Senior Senator in drawing the contrast between them. On election eve last year, Morse made a personal attack on now-Governor Mark Hatfield that every leading Democrat in the state immediately repudiated. Morse charged that Hatfield had lied to a jury some 18 years ago when, as a youth, Hatfield ran over and killed a child. The jury had to decide on civil damages and got conflicting accounts of how the accident happened. Lawyers and even a Supreme Court Justice who sat on the case on appeal blasted Morse's twisting of the case to buttress his argument that Hatfield could not be trusted. Republican Hatfield won the election by a hefty majority and was unquestionably helped by Morse's blast.

LAST FALL, Neuberger was found to have cancer and underwent treatment in Portland. Returning to Washington after the election, Morse leaked to two reporters that he and Neuberger had had some hot correspondence. Copies were printed. The publication did Morse no good. His language was often intemperate. (Neuberger was "amoral," he wrote.) Morse followed this up with a statement blaming their differences on Neuberger's illness which, he said, probably had a greater psychological effect on Neuberger than even the patient realized. It was all read by the folks back home.

C. Girard Davidson, Oregon's Democratic National Committeeman, many months ago was promoting Morse as a favorite son in 1960, believing that this would give Oregon a chance to strike some bargains at the Convention. But Morse's recent behavior helped to knock this idea in the head, and Oregon's primary laws make favorite-son booms hard to manage. A new law allows Oregon's Secretary of State to place the names of all bona-fide candidates on the ballot for the Presidential nomination, with or without permission. The Secretary of State is

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now a Republican: the Democrats can't dictate to him whose name goes on or is left off. Kennedy, Humphrey and Meyner have all been to Oregon with a view to campaigning there next spring; Symington and Johnson are expected later this year; and Davidson is encouraging them all. Nevertheless, the Morse forces won't let the favorite-son idea die. In April when the Senator spoke at the Young Democrats' state convention, his supporters put through a resolution urging his selection. And experienced observers in Oregon believe that Morse is determined to win the free-for-all primary against the field. Knowing that he won't have Neuberger's support for this, they theorize Morse has decided to diminish his colleague's importance well in advance.

Two months ago, in an off-the-cuff speech to the Oregon Farmers Union, Morse shot at Neuberger for supporting an increase in the gas tax, for not backing him in trying to give Oregon cherry-growers tariff protection, and for airing their foreign policy differences. The speech was covered at length by the Farmers Union newspaper, so Neuberger sent copies of it and his answer to most editors in Oregon. It was after reading a story based on Neuberger's rebuttal that Morse announced his intention of campaigning against his colleague. Asked who his candidate against Neuberger is going to be, Morse replied that he wasn't going to name a candidate because that would be political bossism. But as the *Portland Oregonian* pointed out, this leaves two questions unanswered:

> If Morse is unable to persuade a politically strong candidate to run in the Democratic primary against Neuberger, will Morse support any self-starter who puts himself in the race against a Senator who has won respect in both parties? If Senator Neuberger wins in the primary, as he is almost certain to do, will Senator Morse then support his Republican opponent, whoever that may be?

HELEN FULLER

Has the Soviet Challenge Changed?

by LOUIS J. HALLE

THE HISTORIC contests among societies differ from such games as chess in that all the pieces on the board are in a state of constant transformation, changing their identities like characters in Alice's Wonderland. Where a conflict between two societies lasts a generation it is no longer the same two societies that are in conflict.

We commonly disguise these transformations, hiding them from our own knowledge, by a fundamental device of human logic. We give things names that do not themselves change, thereby creating an unchanging nominal world which we substitute in our thinking for the world of reality. This provides us with a basis of stability, however unreal, on which we can form fixed views and formulate standard responses. France is forever France and China, China. Communism, spelled the same today as when the Communist Manifesto appeared in 1848, is manifestly still Communism.

But the stability of the nominal world is constantly threatened by changes in the real world which, in their cumulative development, become increasingly hard to deny. In the years after Stalin's death all of us debated the question whether any real change had taken place in the nature of the Soviet challenge. The widespread anxiety among us to deny it was exceedingly human. Like a football team trying to keep up the old spirit, we urged one another not to be taken in by smiles or soft words from Moscow. We repeatedly announced that there was no evidence of any change. We repeated, until it became ritualistic, the statement that Moscow, however it might have changed its tactics, had not renounced its objective of world revolution. Since the foreign policy which we had established after long and strenuous efforts had been entirely a response to the Soviet challenge as manifested under Stalin, the alternative to such an insistence on the changeless nature of the challenge might have been to see the bases of that policy crumble. This was, and it continues to be, our real and understandable fear.

I do not suppose that the Soviet society underwent any abrupt and fundamental change on the date of Stalin's death. But fundamental changes have been taking place continuously, as in every society, so that the question for us to ask is rather *what* than *whether*.

Marxism, like other ideologies, originally based its program on a complex of predictions implicit in the structure of dogma formulated by its prophet. As is always the case, the actual events of history failed to confirm the predictions, thereby compelling the heirs of the prophet

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to change the program, to make shift in ways that had been totally unanticipated and for which there was no authority in their scriptures. I shall mention here two fundamental expectations of the Communist fathers that the actual experience of history has now disappointed, and I shall suggest the revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) consequences.

The first expectation to be disappointed was that the proletarian masses everywhere would come to side with international Communism against their capitalist rulers and accept the leadership of the Communist élite. Under that leadership they would at last rise up of their own will to overthrow capitalism and, with it, all the sordid apparatus of national states, imperialism and militarism. This looked plausible enough in the middle of the last century, if one projected in a straight line the social developments which could be observed in that period. It was plausible in terms of the extrapolation of those developments. But the history which has since elapsed has not, in fact, followed this predicted course. Instead, in the great industrial countries capital and labor have tended to resolve the class struggle and have increasingly reached an accommodation that has satisfied the welfare and self-respect of labor. The sharpness of the class-distinctions has tended to disappear, and this has made capital and labor allies in their opposition to the would-be leadership of the Communist élite. Instead of becoming more revolutionary, the working masses have in fact become anti-revolutionary.

This failure of a fundamental prediction is, perhaps, more evident today than it was in 1917, when what was supposed to be the first stage in the world revolution was inaugurated by the Bolshevist seizure of power in Russia. Today, however, it is clear that the Communist movement has not been able to win the allegiance of the world's proletarian masses. And even to maintain their rule in Russia the putative representatives of the people have had to depend on measures of brute force that, as an abiding feature of their new society, had not been anticipated.

Stalin met the failure of the prediction to come true by imposing his personal dictatorship inside Russia. He was slower to recognize like requirements for the spread of Communist rule to other countries; but there is every reason to believe that, well before his death, he had come to see that the peoples of the world, proletarian or otherwise, would not voluntarily accept the Communist prescriptions. Consequently, Communist rule could be spread beyond the Soviet Union only by the Red Army, in support of whatever successes of sabotage and subversion might be achieved by Communist agents in each country. If the masses would not respond to the Communist leadership of their own accord, then they would have to be conquered. The unexpectedly overwhelming defeat of the Communists in the Austrian election of 1945, and the failures of Communist subversion in Italy and France during the winter of 1947-48, must have helped teach a lesson that had already been implicit in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939.

THE OTHER expectation of the Communists, which history has disappointed, existed primarily as a tacit assumption. Since, in Marxian doctrine, all the workers of the world are brothers, national divisions being merely the contrivances of their class enemies, all the societies resulting from the Communist revolution must share a harmony of purpose and policy. Any society captured by the international Communist movement would naturally be an ally of the Soviet Union (even after the Soviet Union had resumed, under Stalin, the trappings and regalia of a national state). It would be in Moscow's camp, loyal and valiant in the struggle to overcome Moscow's enemies. Apparently nobody before 1948, on either side of the Iron Curtain, gave much thought to the possibility of such a thing as the development of national Communism outside of Russia. Then Tito's Yugoslavia demonstrated the fact that Moscow could not count on the implicit obedience or cooperation of any independent state, beyond the effective reach of the Red Army, simply because it was Communist. It demonstrated the fact that such a state might put its own nationalism first.

The implications of this demonstration, in terms of the Communist world that was originally projected, seem to me immense. It put in question all the hopes that Moscow had once attached to the prospective enlargement and eventual universalization of the Communist world. Appreciating all the implications of this lesson, Moscow today might well prefer a neutralized and non-Communist Austria to a Communist and potentially "Titoist" Austria; it might prefer a Finland to a Hungary as its neighbor; it might in time come to wish that the Communist revolution had not occurred in China; and it is not inconceivable that the thought of a Communist United States would occasion nightmares in the Kremlin. If the world were Communist, there is no reason to believe that its capital would be Moscow—even if it did have only one capital.

When the nature of the Communist challenge is discussed today we still tend to repeat that Moscow has not given up its objective of world revolution—just as if a proclamation to that effect was what we were waiting for. But I should suppose that Moscow has in fact given it up as a working objective, however much its spokesmen (no less dominated by the nominal world than we) may still, occasionally, give lip-service to it. I should suppose that the question for us to ask now is whether Moscow has, as an alternative, set itself the objective of world conquest.

I suggest that the answer to this question too, in terms of the working objectives of the men in the Kremlin, is no. Opinion varies on the weight of the burden that the indefinite control of the restive satellite populations puts

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on Moscow. Perhaps the burden is still far from capacity. Perhaps Denmark and Sweden could be added to it; perhaps Norway and Holland; perhaps Italy and France; perhaps the British Isles. But somewhere there must be a limit and, in any case, the prospect of such an empire, seething with rebellion, must seem quite different from that prospect of a spreading revolution by the masses themselves which Lenin and his associates looked forward to in 1917. It must give the military and political chiefs in the Kremlin pause. And today, if they were offered the choice of a satellite France or a France on the model of Finland, perhaps they would choose the latter. A commanding position in the world might seem more attractive than the direct ownership of the world.

Has the nature of the Communist challenge, then, changed? I suggest that it has, and that one of the changes is the abandonment of either world revolution or world conquest as a practical objective.

The bulk of the evidence indicates that, when Stalin's successors took over, they looked at the empire he had bequeathed them and found it already overextended. Like the Emperor Hadrian coming into his inheritance in 117 A.D., they decided that the time was ripe, not only to stop the expansion, but for retrenchment and consolidation. They thereupon gave up Austria, which Stalin had been trying to capture; they gave up Yugoslavia; and they took steps in the direction of restoring the independence of Poland and Hungary. They went too far too fast, and when what was intended as a limited retreat threatened to turn into a total rout they had to abandon it.

IF THESE suppositions are correct, then the objectives of Moscow today represent a continuation of those Russian national and imperial objectives that may be traced back at least as far as the beginnings of Muscovy in the 12th Century. They represent this rather than the anti-nationalistic, anti-imperialistic and revolutionary objectives which Lenin, Trotsky and Company had set themselves. They are the old objectives of achieving security for Russia by pushing back the hostile military powers that have always surrounded her. In the long historic course of pushing those powers back, the territory under Russian control has at last expanded to its present inordinate dimensions. And still the drive continues, now taking the form of opposition to NATO bases in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Scandinavia, West Germany and other parts of Europe.

Such an objective, though far from being the same as that of world conquest, implies unlimited expansion, since Moscow can never reach the point of full satisfaction. It must always be impelled to extend still further the area from which it can exclude threats to its security. Therefore, Russia's neighbors must, in the future as in the past, be strong to resist. But the problem that is posed for them, as for Moscow, is a familiar one. It is the old problem of establishing a stable equilibrium of forces and a *modus vivendi* which provides at least the minimum of security that each side must have in order to accept it. This requires a sober and peaceable, but a firm diplomacy, backed by adequate force and determination.

There is reason to believe that it is such an equilibrium as this that Premier Khrushchev and his associates are aiming at today. Such an equilibrium as this is also a proper immediate objective of our own Western policy. But, even though both sides alike wish to achieve it, it will not be easy to achieve, as the present difficulties over the status of West Berlin show.

And we must recognize that when it is achieved, if we can look forward to such a day, it will still not be achieved. For nothing is final in a world of societies that must continue to undergo transformation. When it is achieved as it only can be achieved, tentatively, then we may continue to hope for and even promote, within limits of prudence, the progressive mitigation of the tyrannies under which the satellites suffer. When it is achieved we must still be prepared for that continuation of competition in the sphere of economic and political rivalry which our opponents refer to when they talk of "co-existence," competition which confronts us with a challenge that, within reasonable bounds, we would do well to accept as legitimate. And, when it is achieved, its maintenance will still depend on our ability to keep up our strength.

On Negotiating with the Russians

THE WORD "FACTS" is, in some ways, crucial. I have spoken with Jesuits and Plymouth Brethren, mathematicians and poets, dogmatic republicans and dear old gentlemen in bird's-eye neckcloths; and each understood the word "facts" in an occult sense of his own. Try as I might, I could get no nearer the principle of their division. What was essential to them, seemed to me trivial or untrue. We could come to no compromise as to what was, or what was not, important in the life of man. Turn as we pleased, we all stood back to back in a big ring, and saw another quarter of the heavens, with different mountain-tops along the sky-line, and different constellations overhead. We had each of us some whimsy in the brain, which we believed more than anything else, and which discolored all experience to its own shade.

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON
in "Virginibus Puerisque"

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The State of the Unions

I—Labor on the Defensive

By WARNER BLOOMBERG, JR., JOEL SEIDMAN, VICTOR HOFFMANN

The New Republic **a year ago invited three students of the labor movement to take a fresh look at the state of the unions since merger. All three of the authors are currently teaching—Mr. Bloomberg as Associate Professor of Sociology at Syracuse University; Mr. Seidman as Professor of Industrial Relations in the School of Business at the University of Chicago; Mr. Hoffmann as Professor of Government at Valparaiso University in Indiana. But all three have also had personal experience with the labor movement—Mr. Bloomberg as an hourly-paid employee in a half-dozen different factories; Mr. Seidman as an organizer and in union education work; Mr. Hoffmann as an agricultural laborer and canning factory employee.**

IMMEDIATELY after the 1958 elections American union leaders saw what had been made and found it was very good. A great many labor-supported candidates for Congress had won and most of the so-called "right-to-work" proposals had lost. Now—six months later—the mood of these union officials is anything but jubilant; it runs from deep concern to consternation. No one can be certain what kind of laws may emerge from the debate over "labor reform." Some Congressional conservatives are pressing hard for amendments "toughening up" the original Kennedy proposals, not with the expectation of being able to shove through a stringently anti-labor bill, but with the anticipation of generating enough union opposition to prevent passage—an event they would then translate as "protecting Hoffa and the hoodlums." Hoffa and the top Teamster leadership seem to be playing the same game with "reverse English," beating Congress with noisy belligerency, making it more and more difficult for election-minded Senators and Representatives (and for the AFL-CIO) to hold to a moderate position. At the same time anti-labor business and industrial interests, who for many years praised some of the very unions and leaders now labeled as corrupt, who appreciated their "business-like" policies and "anti-radical" orientations, are using the corruption issue as a lever for legislation that would hurt the more progressive, socially-conscious unions which have remarkably clean records. And certain "liberal" authors and publishers (some of their *best* friends are labor leaders!) have been publishing accounts of individual cases of alleged union corruption or tyranny without much interpretive perspective but with considerable self-righteous indignation.

One of the most serious consequences of the contemporary political and journalistic rhetoric, used to describe the "labor situation," is its reinforcing of simple stereotypes about "*the* labor movement." Giants like the Auto Workers, the Steelworkers, the Teamsters pre-empt the headlines. But smaller organizations, like the Machinists, the ILGWU and the American Communications Workers and the Rubber Workers may at times carry much more weight within the world of labor than size or publicity would indicate. In an entirely different class—and little noticed by the McClellan Committee or the press generally—are the unions which struggle to grow, or sometimes just to persist, on the presently unyielding fringes of unionized industry—the Textile Workers, the Chemical Workers, the organizations of office and retail employees, and the like. And in still another category are the Mineworkers and the Railroad Brotherhoods, associations standing in the shadow of past greatness.

In this study of the American labor movement we hope to say something sensible about each of these, but little of all that we say could apply equally well to all of them. We have approached our subject more as "an-

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thropologists" than "pollsters," depending upon the knowledgeable informant rather than the mass survey. We have talked with top officials and with the less public and much less publicized staff men who serve them and may try to steer them. We have spoken with middle echelon officers in regional or district headquarters, and some of our conversations were with men in local union positions or with active members of the rank and file. We traveled during the past year through the older commercial industrial heartland of the nation—from Milwaukee and St. Paul in the West through Chicago and Cleveland and Pittsburgh to Washington in the East, with visits to less imposing, less central places of union life and corporate industry. Our knowledge about the Far West and the Deep South is largely vicarious. From these spot-checks and soundings we have tried to map the changing terrain of contemporary American unionism.

What They Think of Hoffa

THE STORY of corruption in the Teamsters Union has been told, re-told, and mis-told countless times. Yet it is so central to the present political crisis for organized labor that few conversations with union officials are completed without mention of it. Most of them seem more frustrated than angry with Hoffa and the Teamsters. For they sense that many of the condemnations of "corrupt unions" carry the implicit and unfair charge that most unions are corrupt.

Few with whom we spoke took the position of a local Steelworker president who thought that it would "take years to overcome the mark against us we've gotten from Beck and Hoffa. They should have crucified those bastards!" (Interestingly, he did not think his own local's reputation had been hurt much in his own community.) Most officials recognize that the Teamsters have also been a tough and effective union, wielded by Beck and Hoffa into a truly national organization instead of a loose federation of local and regional baronies. Just as stockholders who have been receiving a good dividend are likely to distinguish between "the company" and individual executives if the latter are shown to be dishonest or otherwise unethical, so unionists—especially the rank and file—are not likely to lose their appreciation for the "bread-and-butter" accomplishments of a union because it is shown also to have serious flaws.

Teamster drivers in Cleveland, averaging $185 a week and protected by substantial pension and welfare plans, are not looking for a "new broom." A survey of Teamster members in Los Angeles disclosed that 60 percent of them believed there was no truth in the McClellan Committee disclosures, 15 percent said that there was some truth, and the remainder had no opinion. Comments of some rank-and-file members in Milwaukee are probably typical: "Well, I don't know whether Hoffa and those guys are crooks or not. But we're better'n we've been for a long time."

"My Dad manages a trucking firm. We need the union to keep things real regular and orderly."

"I've had several good raises since I went to work with the Teamsters. People sure can't complain about that."

In addition, Teamsters locals throughout much of the country are respected as decent organizations—"clean all the way" in Wisconsin, according to an AFL-CIO official there, who added: "And the Teamsters are old-time associates of most of us in the labor movement here." A thoroughly honest Cleveland Teamster official remarked rather bitterly, "I'm not impressed by a lot of people taking cracks at the Teamsters now. The Teamsters have been the backbone of the labor movement. You know, the Meatcutters, the Retail Clerks, the Building Service Employees—these came into existence only with the help of the Teamsters. At the local level we have given and still give cooperation whenever it is asked."

With the exception of the regional ruling clique, the Teamsters in Cleveland are well respected. Their Credit Union, which has handled over $8 million during 18 years, is considered a model in terms of its honesty and its service to members.

Per capita payments to the Teamster national treasury for more than a million and a half members are the highest in Teamster history, and opposition to Hoffa, far from growing since the convention at which he was elected, has all but collapsed in most places. In sum, neither bad publicity nor expulsion from the AFL-CIO seems to have hurt the union badly. It has, however, isolated Teamsters from whatever pressures might have been exerted upon them from within organized labor.

Locally, long associations have begun to wither, in spite of informal ties between other unionists in the community and Teamster officers. The Teamsters are excluded from every function and activity connected with the AFL-CIO. They cannot even join with other unions in raising funds for the Community Chest. In Cleveland during the 1958 election campaign, they could not get speakers to oppose the "right-to-work" proposals from the bureau set up by the United Organized Labor of Ohio, which they alone were not allowed to join.

One of the top leaders of an important industrial union, an honest man in an organization ethically above reproach, reflected the frustration many leaders of organized labor have felt: "We're becoming a goddamned union of purists! We get rid of the hoods, the ku-kluxers, and the commies, while the companies hire them or their counterparts. I'm for reform. I've fought for it. Hell, the moves to bounce the commies and the racketeers go back to the '40's. But it worries me even though I'm for it. I feel like we're dancing to someone else's tune. Kicking out the Teamsters was no solution. We should have

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moved slower and less emphatically—and on our own terms."

(BLOOMBERG: I confess my sympathy for this man's feelings. "Hoffa-ism" is a cancer in the union movement and requires radical treatment. But the body politic has more dangerous malignancies to contend with—such as segregation. Our acceptance as "normal" of impoverished people in America strikes me as posing a more fundamental moral problem than the reincarnation within a few unions of the robber-baron types who helped so much to build up our presently respectable big business at the beginning of this century. In an age of the H-bomb and worldwide revolutionary movements, I find it difficult to become preoccupied with the fact that embezzlements by corporation personnel have hit a record high, or that some union leaders have been caught with their hands in the till, or that use of call girls has become a standard sales technique in certain lines of business.)

(HOFFMANN: In many respects we have become a society of pushers, operators, featherbedders, compulsive hiders of the truth, tellers of lies—slight and not so slight. There are "Hoffas" in business and in universities, but they look and sound different because they have middle-class manners instead of the rugged and at times violent etiquette of the streets and alleyways, and because they are more adept at maintaining the façade of middle-class morality.)

(SEIDMAN: Certainly, corruption in unionism is a reflection of corruption in society; it is hard to conceive of a corrupt union leader flourishing unless there are corrupt businessmen to deal with and corrupt government officials to offer protection. Yet the corrupt union leader is more offensive than corrupt leaders in other walks of life because he betrays a trust given him by underprivileged people. Whether the corrupt unionist loots the union treasury or receives a bribe from an employer, he is diverting to his own pocket income that should go to his membership.

While corruption needs to be stamped out everywhere, it is especially urgent to do so in the case of unions. Business is organized for economic ends, without moral pretense; but unionism, which depends on mass support, is weakened substantially in its appeal if corruption is permitted to flourish.)

The Federation and "Ethical Practices"

THE CRISIS over the Teamsters revealed the determination of the new Federation to maintain a reputation for adequate ethical standards. Given the fact that the merger was still in its infancy, it took unusual courage and devotion to principle to expel the AFL-CIO's largest and most powerful single affiliate, with one-tenth the Federation's membership, a well-filled war chest, and the capacity, by respecting or ignoring the picket lines of other unions, to make or break their strikes. At the time of expulsion, moreover, it seemed quite possible that the discontented building trades might have joined the Teamsters in a coalition opposing George Meany, for the building trades and the Teamsters have in common political conservatism and a narrow concept of unionism, jurisdictional antagonisms toward the industrial unions of the CIO, and similar sensitivities on the corruption issue.

It was the former CIO unions who gave Meany the critical support he needed for his hard line against unions tainted by corruption. But the CIO grouping, deprived of Meany's leadership, could never have obtained a majority for effective action. It would have been a line-up of former CIO unions, aided by several old AFL affiliates, against the bulk of the Federation unions. The Teamster issue also had to be faced in the light of the failure of the AFL campaign several years earlier to put the hoodlum-infested and far weaker Longshoremen out of business.

Hal Gibbons, general vice president of the Teamsters and executive assistant to Hoffa, who built a model labor organization in St. Louis before he rose to national office as a Hoffa ally, hotly denies that the Teamsters are worse than other unions. With some 800 locals and 9,000 to 10,000 officers, some corruption is bound to exist, he admits, particularly in view of the relatively unskilled work over which the union has jurisdiction. When a man who has been convicted of a crime is paroled, Gibbons points out, he is most likely to find work in industries such as trucking, warehousing or gas stations, all of them under the Teamsters' jurisdiction. The investigation of hundreds of Teamster locals by McClellan Committee agents, Gibbons asserts, resulted in the naming of 106 persons as guilty of wrongdoing. But of these, according to the union, 16 were never associated with it, 34 were no longer connected with it, 9 were rank-and-file members, 8 had records of arrests followed by acquittals or no prosecutions, and 26 had been convicted prior to taking office or employment with the union. Equally searching investigations of other unions, Gibbons argues, would disclose equivalent records in proportion to size.

But to many other union leaders this type of defense is really beside the point. To them, the issue is not the number of persons with unsavory records associated with an organization, but the fact that its heads, first Beck and now Hoffa, along with some of their closest associates, have used their union positions for personal gain, engaging in extra-curricular business dealings with employers or manipulating union funds to their own advantage. Nor can it be denied that Hoffa has hired for staff positions—and every such position is, or should be, one of trust—a number of persons with records of offenses involving moral turpitude, and protected many of them despite clear evidence of misconduct. While even a convicted embezzler deserves a chance to redeem himself, one would be suspicious of a bank president who hired large numbers of them as tellers.

The AFL-CIO's codes of ethical practices and actions

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taken to support them have had some important effects. They have helped stop such undesirable practices by union officials as drawing of salaries simultaneously from a union and a welfare fund, and have made union leaders generally more careful about situations involving conflicts of interest. In the case of the Bakers, who would not or could not cleanse themselves, a rival union to replace them has been successfully formed. But the creation of a large-scale rival to the Teamsters was impossible—the chances for success were less than negligible and the effort would have produced union warfare both literally and figuratively bloody.

Government Intervention

PRESIDENT HAYES of the Machinists, who chairs the Ethical Practices Committee of the AFL-CIO, freely admits that the amount of corruption recently exposed proved to be greater than they had anticipated. Both AFL and CIO unionists have been genuinely shocked by the McClellan Committee disclosures, by the depth of penetration of undesirable elements into the leadership of some unions. But they point out that without the subpoena power of a government agency, there was no way in which the dishonesty could have been ferreted out. Like most unionists, Hayes adds that this necessary intervention by government was accompanied by an unfair focusing of attention on unions and relative neglect of management corruption—which, he claims, would be greater if only because much more money is involved.

The case of Carpenters' president Maurice Hutcheson shows a similar pattern of the Federation's tendency today to rely on outside pressures—on the power of government—where corruption is alleged against leadership of a major union. Hutcheson was one of several Indiana labor officials involved in a toll road land scandal that eventually reached the courts. More than a year ago he was asked to give an accounting to the AFL-CIO executive council. But not until May of this year did Hutcheson appear at a meeting, though he is himself an AFL-CIO vice president and a member of the council. But the executive council has thus far held its hand, withholding decision on his suggestion that they now investigate his union and himself. The council will wait for the court's decision later this summer.

Most officials still argue that expulsion of the Teamsters could not have been avoided, even if its consequences have been disappointing. And they add that it will take government action to bring about any real clean-up within the Teamsters in the near future. To be able to force reforms upon powerful labor leaders the AFL-CIO would have to be able to reach down into an affiliated union to remove an offending officer. But just that sort of authority in the hands of national union officers has produced some of the cases of alleged union tyranny! Those most concerned about internal union democracy doubt the wisdom of making such powers available to a body capable of affecting more than four-fifths of American unionists. Furthermore, to be practical about it, such powers could not be assumed by the AFL-CIO, even if some reliable ways could be invented of constraining their use to benefit only democratic elements. We were told again and again by officials, especially from the formerly AFL organizations, that they have already lost more "autonomy" than they had anticipated when they endorsed, or at least accepted, merger.

Congressional action against corruption and the misuse of their powers by union leaders is also preferred by wiser heads in organized labor to the present "receivership" arrangement that the Teamsters have with a federal court. From a legalistic point of view the reforms demanded of the Teamsters by Judge Letts and the monitors are commendable. They will substantially improve the constitution and by-laws and eventually may lead to the removal from their positions of several of the most offensive office-holders. But once the supervision of the monitors is removed, a "paper democracy" will be left. There is no reason to expect a "clean" convention to displace Hoffa or the removal of many Hoffa men from the intermediate levels of power. The rank and file generally will be as inadequate in terms of organizational self-government next year as last. And informal, unofficial, "spontaneous" coercion of dissident members by others of the rank and file can go on in the Teamsters, as elsewhere, in spite of formalistic provisions for freedom of speech and court prohibitions against reprisals.

Arthur J. Goldberg, general counsel to the Steelworkers and one of the country's foremost labor lawyers, recalls the "sad and unsavory episodes" in the history of court receiverships in connection with corporations, in which reorganizations have dragged on for years, sometimes devolving into a sort of continuing patronage for the judiciary. Slowness and lack of sufficient expertise with respect to the many non-judicial aspects of the matters involved have already created serious problems where courts have reviewed arbitration decisions.

While most union officials learned from the passage of the Taft-Hartley law in 1948 that intransigent opposition to any and all regulatory legislation is self-defeating, almost none think that a majority in Congress today really wants to *improve* unions. Even those labor leaders who would welcome legislation specifically aimed at corruption and tyranny are convinced that the major motive force for present legislative action is coming from anti-union elements—the constructive effort of the liberal minority in the Senate notwithstanding. They see a pattern that begins with the Taft-Hartley Act and extends through the so-called "right-to-work" laws proposed or passed in many states to break the union shop and to promote an atmosphere antagonistic to further organizing. They point out that the Taft-Hartley law is largely

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concerned with the right *not* to unionize, with the right to decertify unions. It gives priority of handling to offenses of which only unions can be guilty, and permits state law to supersede federal law on union security only if the state law is tougher. It permits workers hired to replace strikers to vote in union recognition and contract elections and denies the ballot to strikers. The law as a whole is, in brief, consistently on management's side.

"Get the Unions"

THIS FEELING that the boys with power are "out to get" unions is reflected in some observations of Bill Abbott of the Rubber Workers' education department:

"This 'right-to-work' business excited labor more than anything I've ever seen. It brought contributions to COPE to an all-time high. One local went from $20 for political action a couple of years ago to $1,700 in 1958. But it's not a rational matter. I remember one meeting out in Kansas where an ultra-honest district representative got up and argued that this would not be the end of the world for labor, that some of our strongest locals are in RTW states. The boys got madder than hell, and went around asking, 'What's he trying to do, wreck us?' There is a deep-rooted feeling on the part of the union actives that they are really under attack far beyond this legislation—that this is part of a movement to 'get them.' The same holds true of the pro-RTW people among business and professional groups. They seem to feel more is at stake here than the principle, right or wrong, of the union shop. This has become a symbolic thing, and highly emotional."

A district officer from a formerly AFL union, noting that the moving spirit behind the "right-to-work" drive was the Chamber of Commerce, argued that it was the businessman's reaction to the expanding penetration of the American power structure by labor on all levels—"from the Community Chest up." He doubted if big industry, which has adapted to unionism so well, was really enthusiastic about the new "RTW" tactic. Big industry went along, he suggests, in part to keep business-industry solidarity, in part because such laws might prevent unions from developing a "full head of steam."

Union leaders believe—and told us repeatedly—that there is a very real difference between business and organized labor in the relationship each has with elected officials. A COPE staff man put it this way:

"The man who is elected with labor's help is basically without strings. That is, a union's interests are usually not the same kind as a corporation's. The corporation will have many specific tasks for 'its' representative—tariff matters, judgeships for its legal counsels, defense contracts, location of military facilities and various errands to be run with respect to the many government agencies and commissions affecting business and financial affairs. Sometimes you see this sort of thing among unions—those in economically distressed areas, those with rather special problems like the maritime unions or the railroad unions. But the legislator is usually responsible to labor only for the general pattern of his voting on a wide range of broad social issues. Even in the area of labor legislation the unions have been more concerned with general policy than with effects on a particular plant or industry."

The present legislative struggle over "labor reform" is thus seen not purely in terms of Hoffa but as part of a much larger conflict between those who seek to liberalize American social and economic policies and the conservative interests in business, industry and finance. The goal of the latter is not, from this viewpoint, the elimination of the Becks and the Hoffas, but the diminution of labor-supported liberals in Congress and the containment, if not the reduction, of unionism among American workers.

(SEIDMAN: In the light of the disclosures of union corruption and undemocratic practices, the need for legislation to correct these abuses strikes me as prior to that for improvement of the Taft-Hartley law. I agree with those who see the problem as one of getting legislation that will strengthen unions by making them honest and democratic, not take advantage of disclosed evils in order to weaken unionism. If wrongdoing has reached high into union councils, at the top it has been met by vigorous countermeasures that have preserved the Federation's good name, strengthened the moral position of the labor movement, and made it deserving of the respect of government and public alike.)

(HOFFMANN: Yet I have doubts about how much democracy and honesty can be legislated into American institutions. We have a long history of regulatory agencies being captured by their subjects. We have long endured, and too many of us have enjoyed, corruption in city hall and county courthouse. We don't want labor leaders to act like petty politicians, or to mirror the violence and illegality of the metropolitan slums, or to adopt the amoral and sometimes immoral operationalism of those who often control the command posts of finance and industry. Yet this is a manipulative society. In some ways most of us are "operating." I am not clear as to whether we can develop an ethics of power and manipulation. These are partly problems of big organization. Have we learned anywhere how to apply the principles of democratic procedure to organizational life in the age of bigness?)

(BLOOMBERG: Everyone seems so anxious to prove his hands are clean by denouncing the gang with the dirty pinkies. But organized labor remains a critical, if not the major, institutional force for social reform in post-mid-century America. If this political crisis is resolved in such a way that the union movement is weakened, all liberalism will have that much less strength and vitality.)

[*This is the first of a series. The subject of the next article will be the merger itself, how far it has gone and some of the problems with which it must still contend.*]

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Can History Be Made?

by Everett C. Hughes

IN THE MODERN AGE, now at its end, freedom and reason were held to march forward, each lending the other a helping hand. Events seemed to warrant that view. We have now come to a point at or beyond which rationalization—of production, of the management of man, even of consumption and leisure—threatens freedom. This being so, we must ask, as does Mills, "Under what conditions do men come to *want* to be free and capable of acting freely? . . . And on the negative side: Can men be made to want to become *cheerful* robots?"

The Sociological Imagination
by C. Wright Mills
(Oxford; $6)

Mills' book is primarily an essay on political philosophy, whatever readers, reviewers and even the publisher's own blurb make of it. Those who want the essay straight should start to read at, say, the chapter called, "The Human Variety." If the reader is a student, he should start with the Appendix, "On Intellectual Craftsmanship," for in it Mills tells students how he himself works and how they ought to (not how not to.) The earlier chapters are a vigorous attack upon what Mills considers the wrong, even dangerously wrong, ways of doing social science, and especially sociology. The more widely practiced of the wrong ways he dubs Grand Theory and Abstracted Empiricism. And what is wrong with them? It is that they not only fall short of the promise of social science, but that they get in the way of it. Indeed, they incapacitate people for developing that "sociological imagination" which "enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society."

It is indeed—I speak now for myself, not Mills—an exciting and liberating thing suddenly to see the relations between "personal troubles and public issues," between "biography and history." Every good teacher of sociology has seen it happen hundreds of times. A youngster comes to see that his peculiar problems are but a special case in the greater human drama but while what has happened to him has also happened to myriad others in many times and climes, his own experiences and problems are nevertheless unique. After the emancipating excitement of sensing his kinship with Odysseus, Oedipus and the Prince of Denmark, comes—if the pedagogy goes from flower to fruit—the sobering realization that he lives in a particular time and in an on-going social structure. Shall he retreat into alienated adjustment, thus becoming a Robot, cheerful or not? Or shall he enter the fray, making his insights and all the knowledge he can get by all means serve the end of gearing his personal problems, and those of other people, into the public, historic processes of this time—with a belief that history can be *made*.

MILLS' complaint (if so vigorous an attack may be called by so mild a word) is that social scientists—again more especially his own colleagues, the sociologists—will not help the young man take the second solution. The Grand Theorist builds systems in useless jargon (Mills translates some examples into simple English) which tell one little about human variety. By a hidden bias in favor of stability, the Grand Theory takes attention away from the struggle for power. The Abstracted Empiricists, the people who make sample surveys of opinions—Mills says—elevate their particular way of working into a general and presumably the only true theory of science; only that knowledge is worth gaining which can be got by their techniques. Since their techniques ignore social structure and the very concept of history, the Abstracted Empiricists breed a generation of a-historical, anti-structural sociologists—technicians and bureaucrats of the new research. Since their surveys are thought useful by businesses and government agencies, they can and do prosper. Their work, too, ignores larger issues and encourages use of talents for minor bureaucratic ends—or at least for ends not of the social scientists' own choosing.

From time to time, Mills takes back some of his hard words, by allowing—in a footnote or aside—that some of the people working in the wrong way are doing good work; or that the older Abstracted Empiricists who have learned classical social science in their youth are better than their disciples, who have only the new training.

Mills' own use of the sociological imagination in analyzing what is going on among his brethren is uncanny. But as with so many good things, enough is too much. Mills seems a bit enamored of his very great powers of analysis and rhetoric; he is rather obsessed with power as a factor in society. He loves to rub power into every wound. It is this just-a-bit-too-muchness that makes it so hard to tell possession by the divine spirit from possession by the devil.

I do not subscribe to all of Mills' strictures on his (and my) fraternity of sociologists. He gives comfort to those who welcome any excuse to attack social science from either the left or the right flank; to those who, having read his chapters of criticism with glee, will go no further. Yet I cannot but welcome the main points of his criticism; and even more one must both welcome and take to heart his plea for "classical social science" brought up to date. For classical social science—as he defines it—gears the small problems to the large, the private to the public; it attacks the problem of freedom and reason with courageous, passionate objectivity. It makes its methods suit the problem, instead of cutting the problem to suit one's favorite technique. If we who are sociologists have enough of the sociological imagination, we can take the criticism, and devote more time to doing our job than to correcting errors of detail in Mills', or other attacks. I do find some odd lacks and errors, of which perhaps the chief is that Mills says a good deal about Max Weber, but does not mention Alfred Weber who, among modern sociologists, is the one who most strongly insists, as does Mills, that the sociological task is primarily to place ourselves in the historical stream.

Notes on Contributors

SIDNEY HYMAN is a political analyst and the author of *The American President*. LOUIS O. COXE's newest book of poems is *The Wilderness*. EVERETT C. HUGHES is on the sociology faculty of the University of Chicago.

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The Ugly American in his own back yard . . .



By
Joseph P. Morray

A STUDY IN PATRIOTISM AND AMERICAN NATIONAL MORALITY

Is patriotism dangerous? Should it be individual, national or international in concept? Does love of country imply love of mankind?

Mr. Morray's answers to these and other questions are set forth provocatively in a book that analyzes the social roots of patriotism and its psychology, both national and individual. Probing the relationship of patriotism to capitalism . . . to socialism . . . to communism . . . to civil liberties, he questions vigorously America's "official" position in these areas. Pride of State was inspired by the super-patriotism that arose during McCarthy's reign. It neither sugar-coats nor assails the patriotic impulse; rather, it is a plea to temper emotional patriotism with intellectual understanding.

"A perceptive analysis of patriotism, its psychology, its morality, its relation to authority, its action in the United States in respect to capitalism, civil liberties, and militarism, and its significance to the idea of a world community. Throughout, its dangers are stressed."
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MOVIES

The European Fate

PERHAPS the bitterest irony of war is that you have first to beat the enemy, if you can, and then you have to forgive him. The only alternative is to exterminate him. The more villainous your enemy, the more stringently you are bound to forgive him, for you have fought him precisely because you are different from him. The soldier going into battle can know that he is fighting for the right to forgive his enemy and to pay postwar taxes (at least partially) for his rehabilitation: and if he is killed or maimed in the fight, his companions will be doing the forgiving and the paying for him. Sooner or later, after the victory, pity rears its hate-destructive head, and in these days of quick communication and complex dependences, it is sooner rather than later.

Sky Without Stars
(Bakros)

This new German film, which is set in 1952, manages to evoke pity for people who, not long before, were either partners to bestiality or else were *heil*-ing the beasts. The film deals graphically with the hardships brought about by the division of Germany. The devices used to dramatize these hardships are the simplest: a West German border guard (Erik Schuman) falls in love with an East German girl (Eva Kotthaus). She has a child who lives with her dead lover's parents in a comfortable West German town; the complications that follow her kidnapping of her child involve the border guard and lead to a tragic end. The plot is such an obvious one that the author seems to ask you to disregard it and, in return, to promise you that the film will reward you with what it tells of character and era. Except for a little slick cinematic maneuvering just before the end, this promise is kept.

We are given a good sense of the fat of Western Germany and of the aggrieved and righteous zeal with which it is being acquired. The scenes in the grandparents' home—they are prospering grocers—are a nice blend of rampant self-satisfaction and insufficient compassion. In contrast, the scenes in the girl's East German home seem populated with ghosts. Her own grandmother is deranged by bombings in a way that makes her more gentle and loving but absolutely incommunicado; her grandfather, an ex-teacher, passes his empty time correcting and re-correcting twenty-year-old copybooks. (These two parts are particularly well done by Lucie Hoflich and Erich Ponto). The immanence of clumsy amiability-*cum*-threat is symbolized by the visits of a young Russian soldier who plays chess with the old man. (He is acted by Horst Buchholz who has since gone on to leading roles in *Felix Krull* and *Monpti*.) And, to complete the exercise of pity, the cruelty of the border that slices the country is made vivid by the guards on both sides, all German, policing against each other and their own people. The picture ends with police dogs, east and west, snarling and snapping at each other.

In its small way, what this picture conveys basically is a feeling of the European fate: the concept of life permanently cross-hatched by borders and armies, a world of police asking for papers, of wall-safes as hedges against bank failure, of steel shutters over shop windows at night, of obduracy to the poor. (One clever operator in the film says, "There are no bad times, only stupid people.")

In the century of the ICBM the European fate may become the world's, but for the present it is still Continental; the juxtaposition of miraculous cultural achievement and monumental butchery, of incredible cathedrals and concentration camps, a society of human beings—so close to Americans but philosophically so alien—whose definition of life is survival.

This picture was written and directed by Helmut Kautner, a pre-eminent figure in the postwar German film, who has also directed *The Captain from Kopenick*, an excellent re-make of the famous comedy, and *Monpti*, a less succesful garret-romance of Paris. Kautner has both a grasp of character and compassion without sentimentality; and he has an implicative style that makes the settings and by-play contribute movingly to the total effect of his story.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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ART

The Sienese in Cincinnati

THERE'S a tendency among a lot of us to think of Sienese painting as a sweet and quiet prelude to the explosion that was being prepared over the hills in Florence and that was destined not so much to change the course of European painting as to create European painting. We're wrong, of course. It was sweet and quiet, though the words only hint at the peculiar quality of Duccio and his descendants; but it was no prelude. On the contrary, Sienese painting was the beginning of an enduring strain in European art, a strain which accounts for more Italian pictures of the 14th and 15th Centuries than the Florentine strain, and one which, moreover, easily survived the kind of reduction to absurdity that killed the Florentine in the 17th and 18th Centuries. Having survived that catastrophe the Sienese touch, greatly altered but unmistakable, regained its 14th Century dominance during the development of 19th Century Impressionism. In our own century Siena is represented by, of all people, the Fauves, and, not so surprisingly, the Surrealists.

This long tale from the Sienese wood —they painted mostly on panel—is suggested by what is doubtless the most important art exhibition now going on in America, the Lehman Collection of New York having its first full-scale public viewing at the Cincinnati Art Museum.

Cincinnati has never emphasized the special, temporary exhibition, concentrating instead on masterful installation of the permanent collection and on the astute enlargement of that collection. In Cincinnati, then, they may not shoot the works very often, but now that they have, they've come up with what the director, Philip R. Adams, accurately calls, "quite simply the finest private collection in existence today."

The collection was begun in 1911 by the late Philip Lehman of the investment-banking family and has been continued by his son, Robert, who wrote the 1928 catalogue and who is responsible for the present exhibition. Individual pieces and even whole ensembles have been lent generously to the Metropolitan, of which Robert Lehman has been vice president; and about half the collection was seen at the Orangerie in Paris two years ago; but the Cincinnati showing is the first attempt at anything like the total collection.

The installation is the work of the same Serge Royaux who turned the Orangerie into a stylized re-creation of the turn-of-the-century Lehman home in New York. The walls are covered with specially woven fabrics; chandeliers glitter; each gallery is centered on a giant, unholstered circular bench. This setting, combined with the immense spread of decorative arts that accounts for two fifths of the 558 pieces on view, says, in later terms, the same thought that must have occurred to many of the people who originally commissioned or bought a lot of the work, "We like to have nice things around."

That thought is one note in the Sienese strain that runs through the show. That note appears in a lot of the more elaborate ceremonial drinking cups, which could have been designed by Saul Steinberg, in the gaily painted Venetian glass, in both the select examples of Persian faience and the extensive group of Majolica.

BUT the essential Sienese quality comes through in the magnificent run of paintings from Duccio to Matteo di Giovanni with special strength in Sassetta and Giovanni di Paolo. The quiet and sweetness takes on a certain strangeness, an unspecified foreboding in the face of the saint and in the barren, symbol scattered landscape of a Sassetta "St. Anthony in the Wilderness." We are reminded again that while the Florentines conquered Rome and then Europe, they only obscured, they did not convert the other Italian towns developing the Sienese tradition. A special development took place in Ferrara. This is clear in the hypnotized profiles of two facing portraits by Francesco del Cossa, which were among the foundation stones of the Lehman collection. The Sienese drama has become a waking trance. The collection shows a good deal of the Sienese quality in the Florentine work itself. The main line of Giotto, Masaccio, Michelangelo is unrepresented. The best known Florentines in the show are Botticelli and Uccello; both are painting dreams.

Through the Sienese at the papal court in exile at Avignon, the strain was transplanted to France and to Flanders. The Flemish paintings include the great Petrus Christus "Legend of Sts. Eligius and Godeberta." Again, as in a beautiful Memling "Annunciation," the palpable reality of objects and space does not disturb the dreaming.

NOR does the 19th Century. The collection's Corot is a "Diana and Actaeon" in the general style of Poussin. Boudin's "Beach Scene," Seurat's sketch for the "Grande Jatte" both memorialize moments of dream. It comes as no surprise that Renoir is particularly well represented in dreaming flesh and dreaming field. Nor that Bonnard and Vuillard are both present in strength. They continued the gentle world of the Impressionists long after most of the Impressionists themselves were dead and gone.

One of the great revelations of the

"Enthralling and disturbing."
—Saturday Review Syndicate

The Jury Is Still Out

By IRWIN D. DAVIDSON
Judge, Court of General Sessions, New York County
and RICHARD GEHMAN

The judge who tried the shocking case of seven New York boys charged with gang murder tells the inside story, in a book that probes deep into the causes of juvenile delinquency.

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show is the ease with which a number of superb Fauve paintings fit right into the pattern as established. Imbued as we are with the notion of art as protest, as violent gesture, we conveniently interpret the bold color and bolder stroke pattern of the Fauves as pure protest. Here we see, in a brilliant Derain "Houses of Parliament" and some Vlaminck pictures that, as the old saying has it, they dreamed in Technicolor.

When we reach the present century we find no Picasso but excellent early examples of Braque and Matisse. The single Italian painting is by Modigliani. The single Spanish is Salvador Dali's perfect re-creation of the dream of Vermeer in the "Lacemaker."

The Lehman Collection will be in Cincinnati through the first week of July and who knows when it may be available again? At the very end of the show, among the Venetian glass, appears a familiar sign, six balls, one of them bearing the fleur-de-lis, the arms of those other bankers, the Medici.

FRANK GETLEIN

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

son] is limited to adhering to a wartime enemy and giving him aid and comfort." This is simply untrue, as anyone can check by reading Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution. Two forms of treason are defined in the Constitution: the adherence to enemies Mr. Rogers mentions and "levying War" against the United States, or, in more modern terms, organizing armed insurrection.

Mr. Rogers' initial misstatement spawns further errors. It is entirely true, as he says, that the framers of the Constitution defined treason narrowly in order to ban the constructive treasons of the English common law from our shores. They were interested in protecting the right of political dissent and the right of Americans to oppose and oust their governments, but the framers of the Constitution had no interest in protecting Americans who adhered to the wartime enemies of their country.

Ezra Pound volunteered to continue to broadcast in English on the Rome radio after Italy declared war on the United States. He thus made himself an agent of the psychological warfare apparatus of an enemy power and, as such, adhered to enemies of his country. Pound's broadcasts were directed at American troops. Their purpose was to spread disaffection, doubt and defeatism among our combat forces and thus bring about America's military defeat. To this end, Pound told his American listeners that Hitler and Mussolini "are your leaders" (May 26, 1942), that the US was "illegally at war" and that President Roosevelt was insane, a criminal or both (January 29, 1942). If he was sane at the time, Pound must have been aware of the treasonable purpose and nature of these fulminations. Needless to say, the fact that Pound was ineffectual in his treason no more exculpates him than the fact that Benedict Arnold botched his plan to betray West Point. Nor should it be necessary to add that the constitutional privilege of freedom of speech does not cover service as an agent of an enemy power.

Rogers suggests that Pound's offense was marginal or borderline. This view can be appraised by comparing his conduct with that of "Tokyo Rose" (Mrs. Iva d'Aquino) who was convicted as a wartime traitor to this country. Iva d'Aquino was an American of Japanese descent. She claimed to have been trapped in Japan after Pearl Harbor because her Isei father was in a US internment camp and could not raise her passage home. She also claimed that she took a job as disc jockey and commentator on the Japanese radio because she feared abuse or torture by the Kempeitai (Japanese thought police). A jury convicted her on one count: stating on the radio after the Battle of Leyte Gulf: "Orphans of the Pacific, you are really orphans now. With all your ships sunk, how will you get home?"

By contrast, Pound was not of Italian, German or Japanese origin. He was free to return to America without fear of being interned because of the color of his skin. Nobody threatened him with starvation or torture. He voluntarily presented himself for service to the Italian psychological warfare machine, presumably because he was a man saturated with hatred of his country, the Jews and the free world of the West in general.

Your reviewer apparently was sold on the now-fashionable explanation that Ezra Pound's true allegiance was to the Europe of Provençal poetry rather than to "the realities of Fascism, of Belsen and Hitler." Yet George Orwell pointed out that Pound contributed to Oswald Mosley's review and "was an ardent follower of Mussolini as far back as the nineteen-twenties, and never concealed it." Orwell added that he recalled one of Pound's "disgusting" broadcasts "in which he approved the massacre of the East European Jews and 'warned' the American Jews that their turn was coming presently."

In St. Elizabeths, Pound met with his admirers and disciples, including the convicted rioter and racist agitator, John Kasper. Immediately upon his release, he assailed the United States and its free institutions in hackneyed Fascist terms. In short, Pound's political career has been dismally consistent over a 30-year period and it is naïve to imagine that his radio treason was an aberration resulting from his esoteric cultural interests.

Mr. Rogers drags in the fact that Italy and Germany are back in respectable international society. True. But they are not governed by the Fascists whom Pound served, but by their enemies. He adds the sentimental argument that most other American radio traitors were released from prison while Ezra still vegetated in his asylum. Need one make the comment that the difference between a prison sentence and hospitalization at government expense should be evident to a lawyer?

It is unfortunate that such eminent American writers as Ernest Hemingway and Robert Frost should have worked for Pound's release and covered his case with a patina of false sentimentality. Poets are not above the law of treason.

"MR. DULLES WAS a gallant man; but if he had died of drink, rather than of cancer, we would not honor him less: for his distinctive public achievement was to be active in a weary world, to stand up against the empty, fatigued, jaded relativism of the revolted masses. He declared, simply, that the West would be free, or would die; and that if his policy left him looking like Billy Graham at the Institute for Advanced Studies, that was the way it would have to be."

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N. Y., for a complimentary copy.

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One hopes that the development of the persecution myth of Ezra Pound will not persuade other disloyal Americans that they can become agents of a nation at war with this country without risking a traitor's death.

NATHANIEL WEYL

Washington, D. C.

Mr. Rogers replies . . .

1. The Constitution of course includes armed insurrection — "levying War" against the United States—along with aiding and "adhering" to the enemy, in its definition of treason. Mr. Pound was charged, however, only with the latter.

2. The point of my piece was that one should go slow in accepting the popular belief that Mr. Pound was indeed a traitor under the Constitution as charged. I agree with Mr. Weyl that the case is troublesome. But it seems to me preferable, now that it is clear that Mr. Pound will never be tried, to keep the mind open. Mr. Weyl's comments point up one of the difficulties. In support of the view that Mr. Pound was guilty as charged, he refers to "racist" views and associations after the War was won and Mussolini was dead. This is just the point. Treasonable "adherence" under the Constitution must be to an enemy nation or government; it is not enough merely to "adhere" to some of the same ideas that the enemy happens to hold.

3. I realize that the distinction may seem precious in the face of such hotly unpopular doctrines as anti-semitism but it is one on which the liberties of the rest of us can one day depend. It is not wise to give away too much just to condemn Mr. Pound.

WILLIAM D. ROGERS

Washington, D. C.

► *Catholics in Politics*

SIRS:

THE INTERVIEW between Gilbert Harrison and Senator Eugene McCarthy on "A Catholic in Politics" (*NR*, June 8) was more reasonable and informative than many similar articles I have seen. Just as Mr. Harrison candidly emphasized some of the unfortunate aspects of Catholic pressure, the Senator was able to mention many of the statements by influential Catholics which re-emphasize traditional American principles.

Nevertheless . . . there is the recent birth control furor in New York City, as well as a current case involving a Newark, New Jersey, drug store; in both cases the Catholic position was not that birth control was permissible for those desiring it, but rather that it was immoral *per se* and must not be tolerated.

Mr. Harrison mentions the pressure of the Legion of Decency, and the Senator comments that there are, in reality, numerous censorship groups in our country; this latter statement, though true, hardly excuses Catholic boycotts.

A Catholic, Dr. Norman St. John-Stevas, at a Fund for the Republic seminar in New York City on May 9 said:

> . . . the image of the Catholic Church which has been created in the American mind is not an image of the Church of Christ. It is largely an image of a power structure. . . . A part of this responsibility, a heavy part, rests with Catholics themselves. . . .

HARRY R. MAJOR

Hollywood, California

" . . . patience, reason and good will"

THANK you for your interview with Senator McCarthy. The subject must be as tiresome and embarrassing for you and for him as it is for the rest of us, but somehow we do have an obligation to examine this inherited dispute with patience, reason and goodwill in the light of present day history. I have the romantic hope that in time this controversy will be resolved by men from out West, far, far away from the ancient animosities of the Atlantic seaboard.

EDITH RAY SAUL

Washington, D. C.

► *Roll Out the Barrel*

SIRS:

PERMIT ME to express appreciation for TRB's column, "Roll Out the Barrel" (June 1). The pitch smoke has been so black out here and the firing of brickbats so indiscriminate that it is encouraging indeed when someone comes up with a clear and objective vision. Even to us who have watched them for years it is amazing to see with what abandon and utter disregard of consequences the Republican reactionaries have been willing to burn down the Michigan barn in order to give the Governor a roasting. Our concern is that this may just be the forerunner of the Republican campaign for 1960.

G. M. WILLIAMS

Governor of Michigan

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